In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, inter-continental trade brought with it a novel form of organizing business: the multinational …rm. Headquartered in Europe and operating in Asia, the success of the East India Companies depended largely on the management of overseas outposts, as well as their labor force. Using a dataset of 115 workers hired in Europe to work in Asia, I present the internal structure of civil servants careers and wages in the Dutch East India Company in the eighteenth century.
Introduction
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the establishment of European merchant empires in the East brought with it a novel form of organizing business: the multinational …rm.
Headquartered in Europe, the East India companies operated all around the Indian Ocean stretching outposts from the East Coast of Africa to Japan and the South-Asian Archipelago (today's Indonesia), with vast presence in India.
These companies controlled the eastern trade with Europe, mostly in spices, but also in other Asian products highly valued in Europe, such as porcelain and tea. The companies reached trade agreements with Asian sovereigns for the sale and storage of the merchandise in local warehouses so that it was ready for loading when the ships arrived for the next European-bound voyage.
The success of the companies depended largely on their management of trade and the overseas personnel conducting it, either on land at geographically dispersed trade outposts, or at sea. The trade outposts employed local labor for activities such as loading ships, but also European workers for positions of trust or skill (e.g. constable or bookkeeper).
The latter were the actual in-loco managers of these far ‡ung trading empires. Their pay accounted for the jobs'distant location, often a¤ected by military con ‡ict and ravaged by disease, which workers would reach if they managed to survive the original voyage. Moreover, these workers handled high value goods in distant locations, so their trustworthiness was a matter of major concern to the company's owners. On the one hand, workers'loyalty to the company could be enhanced through higher pay and/or beyond wage compensation. 1 On the other, the company could set up non-compensation mechanisms, such as career progress, that made the worker choose to be honest.
In this paper I present evidence on the internal structure of careers and wages of civil servants in the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, VOC).
The data covers the entire histories of 115 VOC civil servants who spent some time of their 1 For a discussion of compensation structures in merchant empires see Rei (2012) .
careers in the Bengal branch o¢ ce during the eighteenth century. There is information on worker's wage, occupation, promotion, location, as well as the corresponding dates.
The data show that careers in the VOC appear to have had stable paths and fast tracks.
The vast majority of workers in the sample became civil servants, even though some initially joined the sea or military rankings of the VOC. However, workers entering the company in the civil sector progressed faster in the company's hierarchy. There are also sizable returns to tenure. The estimation yields a 5% return per year, which is higher than previous estimations (Abraham and Farber 1987 , Altonji and Shakotko 1987 , Topel 1991 , Altonji and Williams 1997 . This high value on the returns to tenure can be resulting from omitted variable bias given the limitations of the small and old dataset, for example, worker education is not observed. On the other hand, the relatively high returns relative to current studies, can also re ‡ect the speci…cities of these careers, attained on a single …rm in somewhat dangerous occupations.
The three hundred year old data avoids the con…dentiality issues plaguing the current personnel economics literature, which is quite scarce in empirical studies particularly those regarding career progress. 2 In this paper, the nature of the …rm is very clear as are the roles of the workers in it. Despite its age, the VOC mimics well the theories of internal labor markets in today's corporate world. 3 
The VOC: History and Organization
Chartered by the Dutch States-General in 1602, the Dutch East India Company merged six previous merchant companies that had been sending ‡eets to the East since 1595. The early companies of Amsterdam, Delft, Hoorn, Middelburg, Rotterdam, and Zeeland, had varying degrees of success but ultimately competed with each other raising the price of spices in Asia.
The Dutch objective was however, to displace Portugal's empire in the East, and assume 2 See Baker, Gibbs, Holmstrom (1994) for a detailed study of careers in an unidenti…ed large …rm over twenty years. 3 For a review of the literature see Gibbons and Waldman (1999) .
control of the trade of Asian products in Europe. 4 As a result the States-General intervened and encouraged the foundation of the uni…ed company.
The charter conferred the VOC with rights of trade, diplomacy and conquest in the vast area to the east of the Cape of Good Hope and to the west of the Strait of Magellan. Only the VOC, and no one else in the United Provinces, had exclusive rights to create and impose laws; establish forts, factories and settlements; implement an exclusive monopoly of trade;
wage war against foreign powers; and impose capital punishment on individuals under its jurisdiction (Ward, 2009:9-10 In Asia, all VOC operations were centralized in Batavia, the seat of the High Government composed by a governor-general, a director-general (in charge of trade), and an advising body by the name Council of the Indies (Raad van Indie). The governor-general reported directly to the board of directors in Amsterdam in an annual general report (generale missive) on the company's business, which also provided detailed information about the state of the branch o¢ ces in Asia. Beyond the annual report, the governor-general would also send to
Amsterdam the general call from the Indies (generale eis) in which he would inform the 4 Portugal's dynastic crisis in 1580 resulted in the transfer of the crown to Philip II, the king of Spain. Consequently, Portugal became an enemy of the United Provinces of Northern Netherlands, which declared independence from Spain in 1581. 5 The granting of such wide privileges was by no means typical of the VOC. All European merchant companies of the time conducted trade, administered justice and had their own armies, becoming therefore states within a state. Although small, the dataset has detailed information on each worker. Each observation contains the worker's name, place of birth, VOC chamber of origin, age upon entry (when known), date of entry, civil status (when known), job location and corresponding date, occupation and corresponding date, monthly wage by occupation, career payments to the family in the Netherlands, career payments above wage, time spent in Bengal, date and motive of exit, whether a testament was left in the event the worker died in service, and the date of the last payment to the family in the Netherlands.
Variables for location and monthly wage are not available for all years, but just recorded when a worker changed location or occupation. I assume each worker has the same occupation (and corresponding wage) and remains on the same location for intermediate years. a surgery sector, with one and two occupations respectively. Since there were only three workers in these sectors, I merged the artillery sector with the military sector and the surgery sector with the sea sector. In this sample, both ship's surgeons transfer to the civil sector, which was not a general tendency. 7 Lequin provides a hierarchical structure of six occupational levels within the civil sector (labeled 4 to 9 in Figure 2 ), but provides no such distinction within the sea or military sectors. In order to denote some progression in the sea sector I additionally divided it into two levels according to skill (a boy in a ship is certainly less skilled than the ship's captain). The transition matrix on Table 1 Total   115  0  3  1  32  27  58  64  36  21  115 Movement between the sea and military sectors is minimal, with only one transition from the lower sea sector to the military sector (from level 1 to 3) and no transitions in the other direction. From the observed pattern, one may be led to believe that the sea and military sectors were just launching pads to the civil sector. However, given the nature of operations of the VOC, the company certainly needed experienced soldiers and sailors. Those not being prevalent workers is yet more evidence that this is a sample of civil servants.
The exit pattern by level on the last column of Table 1 shows 72 workers exiting the VOC as merchants (level 7) or higher and only 21 of those reached the top level of the civil sector.
Since these were civil servants in a trading company, it seems strange that 37% of them (43 workers) left the company before reaching the position of Merchant, exiting at level 6 or less.
This tendency begs an inquiry about the exit motives of workers, which show in Table 2 . Workers leaving the sample due to retirement, departure from the East, or arrival in the Netherlands completed their contracts. 9 Of the remaining workers, 22% left the VOC for unknown motives and 47% have incomplete career paths due to contract termination or death (46%). The latter con…rms the knowledge that many of these distant locations were continuously struck by disease and often subject to military con ‡ict. Such high morbidity raises issues on the accuracy of the last column on Table 1 : since at least 46% workers have their careers truncated the observed exit pattern does not necessarily serve as an indicator of ability. Table 3 shows the death pattern according to the levels at which workers exit the sample.
Similar to the exit pattern, the number of deaths decreases as we move up the civil service hierarchy. However, the percentage of deaths among those who exit the sample does not exhibit that same monotonic pattern and stays generally high. This being the case, it seems 9 The distinction between the last two categories is minimal and mainly related to company's records: some workers are registered as arriving back in the Netherlands after serving in the East, while others are just recorded as having departed from the East on company's return ships. In either case, these workers concluded their time of service in the VOC and returned to Europe. reasonable to conclude that, in this sample, death occurred at random across all levels, even if it was the most common motive for leaving the VOC. (9) There are no exits from the sample in the military sector (level 3) and no seamen die on the job (levels 1 and 2), so all deaths occur among civil servants. Since most workers in the sample transfer to the civil service it is worth to investigate whether death a¤ected career length and whether the latter was associated with a worker's starting sector. Significance: *10%, **5%, ***1%.
Despite the death pattern showed in tables 2 and 3, was relevant for promotions and earnings is the subject of the following two sections.
Promotion Patterns
I now turn to the workers'progress in the VOC's civil service. Is it the case that those who entered the company in a given sector or higher in the hierarchy had faster careers? Or, on the contrary, did workers starting at lower levels have a better chance of reaching the top?
The time span covered by the data (1669-1799) represents a large portion of the company's history. The observed career patterns in this sample, however small, are therefore good approximations of a worker's expectations upon the o¤er of an overseas job at the VOC. Table 5 shows the waiting time for promotion to any given level since entry. Each worker waited on average 5.9 years to be promoted to the next level. The long waiting time to get from the lowest to the highest level of the sea sector -9 years on average-is due to the large number of occupations (job titles) in each level of the sea sector (8 in each). 10 The short waiting time for promotion into the military sector (level 3), is misleading as it refers to a single worker that transfers from the sea to the military sector. The di¤erence between waiting time from entry up to level 5 and from entry up to level 6 is just one year, possibly indicating that level 5 was just a transitional trial-level before getting to the position of Junior Merchant (level 6). Waiting time for promotion from entry up to the various levels of the civil sector intuitively increases in level, but does the waiting time for promotion up to any level vary with the sector of entry? Table 6 shows the waiting time for promotion to the lower, middle, or top of the civil sector (levels 4, 7 and 9 respectively), given the worker's sector of entry into the VOC.
Workers who started in the civil sector progressed faster to the top than workers starting as military or seamen, the latter exhibiting the slowest progress. Original seamen would take double the time to get to be merchants (level 7), when compared to new entrants in level 4, the lowest of the civil sector (20.4 vs 10 years). Similarly, to get to the top of the hierarchy (level 9), the original seaman would have to wait 30 years, compared to 17.5 for civil sector entrants. Also, …ve times as many workers reached the occupation of Director (level 9) if they started in the civil sector, than in any of the other two starting sectors. The same pattern, though not magnitude, is true for the occupation of Merchant (level 7). Since the vast majority of workers in the sample transferred to the civil sector, entry into sea sector implied a slower career path since the waiting time to reach the lowest level of the civil sector was two years longer than that of the military sector (5.8 vs 3.8 years). Starting in these two sectors implied longer, but also slower careers.
Progression within the civil sector shows in Table 7 Junior Merchants (level 6) faced the longest waiting time for promotion, 8.6 years, exactly double of the previous level. It is also into level 6 (and from level 7) that the two demotions in the sample occur. One of the demotions implied wage loss: from Merchant earning 60 ‡orins a month, to Solicitor earning 50 after two years. The other demotion appears to have meant just a title change, from Merchant to Provisional Merchant, but the wage kept constant at 50 ‡orins a month even after 13 years. This last case may be a data entry mistake from the source, given that the earnings of a merchant do not correspond to the wage schedule in the appendix, moreover this same worker is promoted to senior merchant later in his career.
After level 6 the waiting time for promotion decreased, especially for the top executive level. The personnel policy of the VOC seems to have made it harder to reach the occupation of Merchant (level 7), after which workers progressed faster to the top. But did workers who wait less for the …rst promotion, have faster careers?
Since this is a sample of civil servants, I now investigate if there is a correlation between the time for promotion to a given level in the civil sector (4 to 8) and the waiting time for promotion from entry to upper levels. .1395 8 -9
.1619 Table 8 shows correlations that are generally positive showing that a fast track existed:
the shorter the overall time from entry into any stage of the civil sector, the shorter the waiting time for promotion from that stage to upper levels.
There are a few notable exceptions. All correlations of the waiting time for level 6 with promotions to higher levels are negative, but the correlation size decreases at higher levels. 
Career Returns
With the career and promotion patterns well de…ned, I now investigate the returns to tenure in the VOC. Did workers with slower but longer careers earn more throughout their tenure than workers who progressed faster through the company's internal ladder but had shorter careers? To answer this question it is necessary to understand the …rm's compensation structure.
Merchant empires typically had two forms of labor compensation: a wage, according to occupation; and an above wage income, which could take the form of trade privileges, gifts and payments from local jurisdictions or …nancial advantages associated with a given position. In the Dutch empire the wage share of total compensation was roughly 64% leaving a non-negligible component to above wage income (Rei 2012 ). Table 9 shows the potential e¤ects of career length, death and starting sector on total career earnings. 11 As with career lengths, death remains largely insigni…cant for the determination of career earnings. Longer careers seem to have in ‡uenced career earnings positively as expected. Starting sectors also yield signi…cant results with workers original civil servants bene…ting relative to sailors and soldiers. Even though the latter have longer careers on average, as Table 4 shows, once career length is accounted for starting in the military or sea sectors has a negative impact on earnings.
12 11 Similar results yield for wage and above wage income. Signs and signi…cance remain unchanged but magnitude di¤ers a little. 12 Cross products between carer length and starting sector are statistically insigni…cant. Unfortunately, data on non-wage compensation is only available in career totals, but the detailed monthly wage data allow the computing of the wage earnings pro…le in the VOC.
Since there is information on each worker's entire wage history I can estimate the returns to tenure including individual …xed e¤ects and therefore controlling for unobserved selection or ability biases. Table 10 shows estimated returns of approximately 0.05 per year, which is on the high end of the range of estimates in modern datasets (Farber 1999) . The di¤erent nature of the VOC and the di¢ cult conditions of these overseas jobs probably have no equivalent in modern from the regression), workers in the military and civil sectors had statistically signi…cant higher earnings even after accounting for experience. In sum, having longer careers did not translate into higher life-time earnings.
Conclusion
This paper focuses on the personnel policies of one of the …rst ever multinational …rms, the VOC. In particular, I investigate the company's career structure using a dataset of 115 workers hired in the Netherlands to serve in the company's o¢ ces overseas.
According to the data, workers starting as sailors or soldiers had longer careers, even though their progress through the company's internal ladder was slower and their earnings lower than workers staring as civil servants. Careers in the VOC appear to have had stable paths, fast tracks in promotions, and sizable returns to tenure. These …ndings are consistent with the empirical implications of recently proposed models of the internal labor market of …rms. 
